flowchart LR
subgraph Deliberation
E[You]
A[A]
B[B]
end
subgraph Implication
BeA[Belief A is possible]
BeB[Belief B is possible]
end
E -->|considering| A & B
A --> BeA
B --> BeB
Is deliberation rational?
Introduction
- As a species, we are ever deliberating, planning, scheming, weighing the pros and cons of our actions.
- This activity implies a belief in free will.
Therefore, this is inconsistent:
- Person says there is no free will.
- Person deliberates \(\to\) free will exists.
Plan
- General plan is to explore deliberation and the rejection of free will.
More specific plan is to try to answer these questions:
- If you deliberate, then do you believe in free will?
- Do actions always speak louder than words?
- Is it ever OK to have inconsistent beliefs?
Clarification
- Deliberation does not entail that we are free
- Our deliberation might be pointless
- But it does seem to entail that we believe in free will
Deliberation defined
When we deliberate
- we consider which of two actions \(A\) or \(B\) to perform.
- we consider the pros and cons of each
- the process assumes we believe that both \(A\) and \(B\) are possible courses of action.
Deliberation visualized
flowchart LR
subgraph Deliberation
E[You]
A[Fight the teacher]
B[Chill]
end
subgraph Implication
BeA[Possible to fight the teacher]
BeB[Possible for me to chill]
end
E -->|considering| A & B
A --> BeA
B --> BeB
Inconsistency
- Belief: Tek believes that there is no free will
- Action: Tek deliberates
- Belief: Deliberation implies a belief in free will.
- Tek’s actions are inconsistent with his beliefs
Inconsistency Visualized
flowchart LR
subgraph Deliberation
E[Tek]
A[X]
B[not-X]
end
subgraph Implication
BeA[Possible to do X]
BeB[Possible to do not-X]
F[I believe I'm Free!]
end
subgraph Words
W["I am not free"]
I["I believe I'm not free"]
end
W-->I
E -->|considering| A & B
A --> BeA
B --> BeB
BeA & BeB --> F
I -.-|contradiction| F
Inconsistency and irrationality
- P1. P and not-P cannot both be true.
- P2. If you knowingly believe in P and not-P, then you are knowingly believing something that cannot be true.
- P3. It is irrational to knowingly believe in false things.
- C. Therefore, it is irrational to knowingly believe in inconsistencies.
Diagnosis and cure
- Diagnosis: Tek’s beliefs are inconsistent.
- Prescription: If you have an inconsistent set of beliefs, drop one of your beliefs.
- Stop deliberating and deny free will (circle of control, present anchoring, )
- Keep deliberating and accept free will exists
Diagnosis and cure visualized
flowchart LR
subgraph Diagnosis
A[Actions]
F[I believe I'm free!]
W[Words]
N[I believe I'm not free!]
C[Contradiction]
IR["Irrationality (BAD)"]
end
subgraph Prescription
B[Become consistent]
S["1. Stop deliberating"]
BF["2. Accept free will"]
end
A --> F
W --> N
F & N --> C
C --> IR
Diagnosis --> Prescription
B -.-> S & BF
Criticism
We can criticize this line of thinking in two ways:
- Diagnosis is wrong
- Tek’s beliefs are not inconsistent.
- Inconsistent beliefs are not always irrational
- Prescription is mistaken:
- Inconsistency does not entail you should give up a belief
Are Tek’s beliefs inconsistent?
Criticism 1: Diagnosis 1
Perhaps Tek’s beliefs are not inconsistent** because we are extracting Tek’s beliefs incorrectly.
- We often say “actions speak louder than words”
- Perhaps Tek does not believe what he is saying (Tek believes in free will!)
Proper prescription: Just say what you really believe.
Criticism 1: Actions and words
Modified example from van Inwagen (1983):
- Man swears he believes his wife is faithful.
- He is always checking her phone
- Follows her when she leaves
- Always questions her about her whereabouts
His beliefs are not inconsistent: he doesn’t believe what he says.
Exercise
Criticism applied to freedom
- Deliberation implies belief in free will
- Words sometimes conflict with this.
- Actions speak louder than words.
- No inconsistency: true belief is “I believe in free will”
Response
This criticism would not work if “actions do not speak louder than words”:
- Actions and words equally indicate their real beliefs (neither holds greater value)
- Words are a better indication of real beliefs.
If the above:
- In case (1), there would be inconsistency
- In case (2), deliberation would not indicate a belief in free will.
Response visualized
flowchart TD
subgraph Actions
M[Actions speak louder than words]
D[Deliberation implies free will]
end
subgraph Neither
E[Actions = Words]
I[Inconsistency]
end
subgraph Words
W[Words speak louder than actions]
nD[Deliberation does not imply free will]
end
Actions -->|reject| Neither & Words
M --> D
E --> I
W --> nD
Words and actions (equal)
Take the man who says he believes his wife is faithful.
- He swears this is the case.
- He says you can punish him if he doesn’t.
- He knows you know about his actions.
It seems like (1) he believes what he says but also (2) he does not believe what he says.
Words and actions (equal)
If words and actions are equally weighted, then:
- there is the inconsistency
- prescription: remove the inconsistency by changing one of your beliefs
Case 2: Words trump actions
Suppose you have a study partner.
- They say they are going to fail their exam.
- “there is no point, I’m going to fail.”
- “I’ll just study anyway but it is useless.”
Still take the exam.
Case 2: Free will
If a person who denies free will is like your study partner, then:
- They do not believe in free will
- But they are just going through the motions anyway (pointless activity that has no impact).
They believe only one outcome is possible, but just deliberate anyway.
Exercise: Words trump actions
Is having inconsistent beliefs irrational?
The prescription
If Tek’s beliefs are inconsistent, then the claim is:
- Sickness: Inconsistency entails irrationality (part of the diagnosis)
- Prescription: He should give up one of his beliefs
We’ll consider why this line of thinking is flawed.
Inconsistency and false beliefs
Recall why having a set of inconsistent beliefs is bad:
- P and not-P entail we have a false set of beliefs
- Bad to believe in false things
I believe I can fly!
Keeping it inconsistent 1
Suppose an astronomer who
- cannot give up their belief that the sun is a divine being, and
- intellectually believes that the sun is an astronomical body.
So …
- If consistency is important, the astronomer should give up belief (2).
- \(\{1, 2\}\) are false, but so is \(\{1\}\)
Keeping it inconsistent 1
- The cure does nothing: still left with false belief
- Costly prescription: belief change is costly (psychologically)
Continuation:
- Possible response: P and not-P is necessarily false, but a false P is just contingently false.
- Response: Why would the modality of the falseness make it better or worse?
Keeping it inconsistent 2
Consider what benefits the astronomer gets from having both beliefs:
- belief that the sun is a divine being (zero benefit)
- sun is an astronomical body (some benefit)
Giving up (2) would actually make the astronomer worse off.
- Prescription: Be consistent, drop belief (2)
- Practical rationality: Be inconsistent, keep belief (2)
Keeping it inconsistent
flowchart TD
subgraph Doctor
I[Inconsistent beliefs]
IR[Irrational]
G[Give up a belief]
end
subgraph Zero
F[Still left with false belief]
N[Not better off]
end
subgraph Worse
L[Loss of true belief benefits]
W[Worse off]
end
Doctor -->|response| Zero & Worse
I --> IR --> G
F --> N
L --> W