Does reality grow?

David W. Agler

The Pennsylvania State University

Growing Block Theory (GBT)

GBT

  1. A-theory
  2. Past-presentist temporal ontology
  3. Ontological-change dynamic theory of temporal passage: time passes because what exists (the events) or the instantiation pattern of what exists changes.

Temporal ontology

  • Presentists: existence is coextensive with the present
  • GBT takes existence to be coextensive with the past and present.

Passage of time

Change in the world is a matter of addition.

  • New entities come into existence
  • New entities never go out of existence

Called “growing block” because reality is a 4D block with new time-slices constantly being added.

Arguments

  1. Intuitive
  2. Consistent with free will
  3. Consistent with thinning-tree view (open future)
  4. Consistent with temporary intrinsics
  5. Solves the grounding problem

GBT Visualized

GBT

For

Intuitive

Free will

Thinning tree

Temp Intrinsics

Grounding

Grounding problem

One strength of GBT over presentism concerns the grounding problem.

  • Contingent past-tensed truths (e.g., “there were dinosaurs”)
  • Presentism has no viable way of grounding these truths because the past does not exist

GBT Solution

GBT has a straightforward solution

  • Past-tensed contingent propositions are made true by the way the world is in the past.
  • “Dinos existed” - made true by Dinos existing in the past.

Problems

  1. Criticisms
  2. Physics STR
  3. Epistemic objection

Epistemic objection

  • If a theory of time says there is a present, then we should be able to know whether we are in the present.
  • If we cannot know, then no reason to think that the present exists.

Scenario 1

Take two people: Liz and Tek.

  1. Liz is in 2026
  2. Tek is in 2026

What is the conscious experience of each?

  • Liz: I am having an experience now that I believe to be in the present moment.
  • Tek: I am having an experience now that I believe to be in the present moment.

Liz’s reasoning

  • Liz: I am in the present because I am at a later time than Tek.
  • Problem
    • Tek reasons the same way about people before him.
    • Nothing about Liz’s or Tek’s experiences tell us whether there are people having the same experience at later times.

Result: Liz’s conscious experience does not tell her whether there are times after her conscious experience.

But …

Liz might say

  • I am having an experience right now.
  • Therefore, I am having an experience in the present.

“Now”

I am having an experience “now”.

  • Indexical “now” - refers to the time of the experience
  • Objective “now” - refers to the time of the objective present.

Our conscious experiences of “now” is of indexical “now” (when the experience occurs) not in the objective “now” (the objective present).

Two experiences of “Now”

  • Experience 1: Liz has an experience in objective present.
  • Experience 2: Liz has an experience in past.

The two experiences are subjectively identical.

  • Our experiences in the past are not faded
  • Person in past believes they are in the present.

Epistemic objection

  • P1: For any theory of time \(T\) that contends there is an objective present, then it ought to be epistemically possible to know whether you are in the present (it should be epistemically possible to know whether the indexical now is objective now).
  • P2: If GBT is true, then it is not epistemically possible to know whether you are in the present (there is no way to know whether now is now since the two are subjectively indistinguishable).
  • C: Therefore, GBT is false.

Epistemic objection visualized

GBT

For

Intuitive

Free will

Thinning tree

Temp Intrinsics

Grounding

Against

Criticisms

Physics (STR)

EPI

Exercise

Draw two people at two different times where both believe they are in the present moment.

Responses

Growing block theorists have two responses.

  1. Old GBT response
  2. New GBT response

Knowledge

Knowledge is usually defined as follows:

  1. \(S\) believes \(P\),
  2. \(P\) is true,
  3. \(S\) has justification for their belief in \(P\).

Internalism vs. Externalism

One necessary condition for knowledge is justification.

  1. Internalism: knowledge is justified solely by internal factors (think mental, reasons or evidence you could cite)
  2. Externalism: knowledge is not justified solely by internal factors but may involve external factors.

Internalism

“I know there is a barn in that field.”

  • I am currently having a conscious experience (seeing) a barn.
  • I had a conscious experience yesterday.

“I exist.”

  • I can reason to my existence
  • I try to doubt my experience, doubting implies a doubter, therefore I exist.

Externalism

Externalism asserts that justification of belief can depend on a subject’s relation to certain external states, e.g., reliable belief-forming processes due to the world.

Example 1

Tek does hallucinogenic drugs and now has two beliefs:

  1. I believe aliens made the pyramids.
  2. 5+10=15

He does not have justification because his beliefs were not caused by an external, *reliable belief-forming process.

Example 2

Tek sees a tall man steal a Snicker’s bar.

  • I believe a tall man stole a Snicker’s bar.
  • Forgets he ever saw the man steal the bar.
  • Still holds the belief.

Tek has justification because his belief was caused by a reliable belief-forming process (perception).

Example 3

  • Tek reads about Napoleon in a textbook
  • Forms belief \(B\) about Napoleon

Tek has justification because his belief was caused by a reliable belief-forming process (reliable chain of testimony and documentation).

Example 4

Tek, Liz, and Jon read 32 degrees off their thermometers and form the belief “it is 32 degrees” (their memories of the thermometers are wiped).

  1. Tek: working thermometer 32 degrees
  2. Liz: broken thermometer 32 degrees
  3. Jon: random-number generator 32 degrees

Only Tek has justification because he has external justification (causally connected to a device that produces reliable belief formation)

Crass clarification

  • You can know stuff even if (1) you don’t know how you know and (2) you can’t justify it to others
  • You just need to put yourself in situations where the world will give you the right beliefs

Prudential upshot

  1. Surround yourself with smart (wise) people
  2. Don’t do drugs
  3. Put yourself in environments that reliably produce true beliefs.

Exercise

Describe two scenarios:

  1. Belief produced by an external process that does not produce reliable beliefs.
  2. Belief produced by an external process that does produce reliable beliefs.

GBT and externalism

  • Epistemic problem is that there is nothing about my internal conscious experience that allows me to know that I’m in the present.
  • Conclusion: I can’t know I’m in the present because I can’t internally justify it.

Solution: Maybe we can get external justification!

GBT externalist trick

  • Tek in the objective present
  • Liz in the objective past

Neither can internally justify they are in the present, but Tek can know he is in the present.

  1. Belief: “I am in the present”.
  2. Truth: “I am in the present”.
  3. Justification: “I am in the present”. Produced by the latest timeslice of the world being added.

Problem 1: Cause and effect

  1. Cause = World (Present timeslice)
  2. Effect = Belief (I am in the present)

Problem:

  • If a cause comes before its effect, then the cause is always a past state of the world.
  • I may have a belief (“I am in the present” in the present) but it is not caused by the present.

Problem 2: Limited knowers

Many people believe they are in the present, but only an infinitesimal number of people have knowledge

  • P1: If a theory of time is true, then the number of people who know they are in the present should not be infinitesimal.
  • P2: If GBT is true, then the number of people who know they are in the present should not be infinitesimal.
  • C: Therefore, GBT is false.

Problem 3: Norman

  1. Norman is a clairvoyant
  2. He does not know he is a claivoyant
  3. He thinks it is irrational to believe in things produced by claivoyance.
  4. He has a clairvoyant belief that the President will be in the US.
  5. His belief is true.

Problem 3: Externalist objection

  • Objection: result is counterintuitive.
  • From Norman’s perspective, the belief is completely arbitrary and irrational (as he does not believe in clairvoyance).
  • Result: Having one’s beliefs formed by a reliable (external) process is insufficient for justification.

And so, merely having one’s beliefs produced by the latest temporal timeslice (with no internalist evidence) is insufficient.