Study Guide

Author

David W. Agler

Published

September 28, 2026

Description

This is a study guide to help you prepare for the exam. While it aims to be comprehensive, it is not guaranteed to cover every topic that may appear on the exam. It is important to review all of your notes and the course materials.

Questions

What is the branch of philosophy that investigates the most fundamental and general aspects of reality by clarifying and evaluating propositions about the status, nature, structure, and origin of what exists.
True or False. One method for doing metaphysics is to take vague belief about the fundamental features of reality and clarify them through reflection and analysis.
True or False. One method for doing metaphysics is to clarify a theory about the world (a metaphysical theory) by getting that theory’s truthmakers.
True or False. One method for doing metaphysics is to evaluate different metaphysical theories by doing a cost-benefit analysis.
True or False. One method for doing metaphysics is to check whether the theory is consistent with logical laws.
True or False. One method for doing metaphysics is to check whether the theory is consistent with the best science (in other words, theories are formulated and we test whether they conflict with the best science).
True or False. One method for doing metaphysics is to check whether the theory is consistent with our intuitions.
What is the name of the following argument for the existence of God: P1. I prayed for X. P2. I received X. P3. The best explanation for the how I received X is that God exists and made X the case. C. Therefore, God exists.
What is the name of the following argument for the existence of God: P1. Everyone believes in God. C. Therefore, God exists.
What is the name of the following argument against the existence of God: P1. If someone receives no visible sign of God’s existence, then they have no reason to believe in God. P2. Certain individuals have not been given any visible sign of God’s existence. P3. It is claimed that knowledge of God is one of the greatest goods. C. Therefore, either God does not exist or God is cruel (for denying visible signs to people).
Which question involving personal identity asks the following question: what properties, characters, features, etc. are necessary and sufficient to count as a person?
Consider the following passage from Richard Swinburne (Personal Identity: The Duality Theory, p.14): “Substances are individual substances which they are because of the matter out of which they are made and the form which is given to the matter. By ‘the form’ is meant those properties (normally of shape and organization), the possession of which is essential if a substance is to be teh substance in question, the properties which it cannot lose without ceasing to exist.” If we ask what form a substance must have in order for it to be a person at a given time, then what question are we asking?
Which theory of synchronic personhood states the following: an object O has the property of being a person at a time t if and only if O looks like a human being.
Which theory of synchronic personhood states the following: an object O is a person at a time t if and only if O is a human being.
Which theory of synchronic personhood states the following: an object O is a person at a time t if and only if O has a soul.
Which theory of synchronic personhood states the following: an object O is a person at a time t if and only if O can perceive itself perceiving.
Which theory of synchronic personhood states the following: an object O is a person at a time t if and only if O is capable of (1) having ideas beyond those formed immediately by perception and (2) beyond those that are the direct consequences formed immediately by perception.
If two objects \(O_1\) and \(O_2\) are one and the same object, then they are said to be what? Pick the best answer.
If two objects \(O_1\) and \(O_2\) share at least one of the same characteristics (intrinsic properties), then they are said to be what? Pick the best answer.
If two objects \(O_1\) and \(O_2\) share all of the same characteristics (intrinsic properties), then they are said to be what? Pick the best answer.
Suppose two spheres \(A\) and \(B\) that are in distinct locations. While \(A\neq B\), some people might say that they are “the same” or “identical”. What sense of “the same” or “identical” do they have in mind?
What metaphysical question is the following: for two objects \(O_1\) and \(O_2\), where \(O_1\) is at time \(t_1\) and \(O_2\) is at time \(t_2\), what are the necessary and sufficient conditions such that \(O_1\) is one and the same object as \(O_2\)? That is, how do objects (in general) persist through time?
What metaphysical question is the following: for two objects \(O_1\) at time \(t_1\) and \(O_2\) at time \(t_2\), where \(O_1\) is a person and \(O_2\) is a person, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions such that \(O_1\) is one and the same person as \(O_2\)?
What theory of diachronic personal identity states the following: If A is a person at time t1 and B is a person at t2, then B is the same person as A iff B has one and the same soul as A.
Suppose you begin at conception. If you begin at conception, then it appears that only two theories of diachronic personal identity are suitable. The first is that what allows you to be one and the same person over time is that you have the same body (or are the same animal). What is the second?
True or False. One problem with one version of the soul theory of diachronic personal identity is that it is internally inconsistent: (1) the soul begins at conception and (2) the essential nature of the soul is to think cannot both be true.
One issue with thinking that having the same soul is what preserves our identity over time concerns whether the soul thinks (or is conscious). What is one of the primary problems with the combination of views that (1) the soul begins at conception and (2) the soul thinks.
True or false. One advantage of the soulful theory of personal identity is that it can make sense of egoistic concerns about life after death.
In the case of monozygotic (identical) twins, there is only one event of conception (fertilization of the egg by a sperm). What problem does this raise for the soul theory of diachronic personal identity?
Assume what preserves a person’s identity is their soul, that the soul does not begin at conception, and the soul does not think (the soul is not the mind or a set of psychological connections). What are three problems with this view?
What theory says the following: If \(X\) is a person at time \(t_1\) and \(Y\) is a person at time \(t_2\), then \(X\) and \(Y\) are the same person if and only if they have the same body.
The same body theory is vague in that it does not clarify what it means for two persons \(A\) and \(B\) to have the “same body”. What three additional features are added to the biological connectedness theory to address this problem?
Some arguments for theories of personal identity start by considering when we began to exist. One version of this type of argument says that we can trace our existence back to when we were an unthinking human fetus. What two theories of diachronic personal identity use this type of argument? Indicate both.
The fact that people believe that we go where our brain goes can be used to criticize which physicalist theories of personal identity? Indicate all that apply.
Pointing to the fact that conjoined twins are two (rather than one) person can be used to criticize which physicalist theories of personal identity? Indicate all that apply.
Suppose that (1) a person can seemingly survive a hemispherectomy (2) the two hemispheres of a person could be implanted into two different bodies \(A\) and \(B\), and (3) the resulting bodies \(A\) and \(B\) could be intuitively regarded as persons. (1)-(3) raise a problem for which physicalist theory of personal identity. Choose one.
Suppose that (1) a person can survive the replacement of an organ (e.g., their heart), (2) a person can survive minor operations to their brain, and (3) a person can survive the gradual, and ultimately complete replacement of parts of their brain with non-human parts. (1)-(3) raise a problem for which physicalist theory of personal identity. Choose one.
What part of the same brain theory says that you cannot survive the gradual but ultimately complete replacement of your brain material with artificial brain material even though the artificial brain material would preserve your consciousness / psychology?
What theory of diachronic personal identity states the following:If \(A\) is a person at time t1 and B is a person at time t2, then B is one and the same person as A if and only if B remembers the experiences has by A.
Which kind of memory is described as follows: Tek remembers that he had his first kiss in 2024. He was nervous when it happened.
Which kind of memory is described as follows: Jennifer remembers sitting in a car outside her high school after she graduated. She was sad.
Which kind of memory is described as follows: Shinji remembers how to ride a bike.
When memory theories of personal identity say that \(A=B\) provided \(B\) remembers the consciousness of \(A\), what type of memory are they referring to?
True or false. According to simple memory theory, maintaining one’s identity through time requires the memories that make you the same person over time to be occurrent (the active remembering) rather than non-occurrent (also called “dispositional”).
True or false. According to the memory theory of personal identity, a person \(B\) at \(t_2\) must remember exactly what \(A\) did at \(t_1\) in order for \(B\) to be the same person as \(A\).
True or false. One criticism of the simple memory theory of diachronic personal identity is that while personal identity is transitive, memory is not.
What theory of diachronic identity would most likely agree with the following: what matters most for who we are is being able to recall earlier events in our life. I may forget the capital of Pennsylvania or how to ride a bike, but entirely forgetting my first kiss, my first day of college, or the last day I saw my friend who died is to lose a part of who we are. To lose those memories is to no longer be that person.
Here is Tek’s statement of a theory of diachronic identity. Which theory he is talking about? “You see, I’m the same person I was yesterday because I can remember what I did yesterday. And, even though I cannot remember what I did two days ago, my yesterday-self can remember what my 2-day-ago self did. This extends all the way back to my first conscious experience.”
Suppose Tek drinks heavily and does not remember a period of his night from 11PM to 6AM. He remembers bits and pieces leading up to 11PM but this period of time is completely gone from his memory. According to his friends, Tek was awake during this period but Tek has no recollection of what he did or what he experienced. According to both the simple memory theory and the modified memory theory, what would this imply about Tek’s existence during that time?
Suppose Tek wakes up one day and believes he is George Washington. He apparently remembers the actions and experiences of George Washington. According to the simple and modified memory theory, this would imply what?
What theory of diachronic personal identity states the following: If A is a person at time t1 and B is a person at t2, then B is the same person as A iff there is psychological continuity between B and A and there is no other person C who is psychologically continuous with A (non-branching condition)
What principle is defined as follows: if x and y are identical (the same thing), then this identity only depends upon x and y, and not some third item z.
Suppose Tek at t2 (who is in Chicago) says he’s the same person as Tek at t1. Liz says that whether this is true depends upon whether there is another person \(C\) at t2 who is also the same person as Tek at t1. Liz’s remark violates what principle?
True or False. Suppose a case at t1 where Tek in Chicago undergoes teletransportion without fission (his psychology is copied, transported to Liverpool, and placed in a qualtitatively identical body). According to the psychological theory, Tek survives this teletransportation.
Suppose Tek is in Chicago at t1 (call him Tek-Chicago-t1) and then undergoes reduplication (teletransportation) having his psychology copied and put into two different bodies in two different locations. The first is Tek-Toronto-t2 and the second is Tek-Paris-t2. At first glance, the psychological connectedness theory would say that Tek-Toronto-t2 and Tek-Paris-t2 are the same person as Tek-Chicago-t1. And, by transitivity, it would follow that Tek-Toronto-t2 is the same person as Tek-Paris-t2. What is wrong with saying that Tek-Toronto-t2 is one and the same person as Tek-Chicago-t1 but Tek-Paris-t2 is not?
One potential problem for the psychological connectedness theory of personal identity is the reduplication (fission) problem. Suppose person \(A\) undergoes fission as \(B\) and \(C\). What is wrong with saying that \(A\) survives as both \(B\) and \(C\) but \(B\) and \(C\) are different persons? Indicate all that apply (that were discussed in class).
True or False. Suppose a case of psychological fission at t2 where \(B\) and \(C\) are the results of a fission of \(A\) at t1 (suppose \(B\) and \(C\) are psychologically connected to \(A\)). One temptation is to say that neither \(B\) nor \(C\) are the same person as \(A\) because they don’t have the same body as \(A\). However, the psychological theory cannot say this since it would mean abandoning the psychological theory.
One intuition (pre-theoretical judgment) people have about personal identity is that a single person wholly exists in one and only one contiguous location. That is, Tek cannot be wholly found in Chicago and wholly found in Toronto at the same time.
One intuition (pre-theoretical judgment) people have about personal identity is that a single person wholly exists in one and only one contiguous location.
Suppose a theory of diachronic personal identity says that to be the same person over time, you must be biologically and psychologically connected to a future person. What would such a theory be called?
Suppose a theory says that for two persons \(A\) and \(B\) to be the same person, there must be direct psychological connections and psychological continuity that is produced by the brain of \(A\) and the brain of \(B\). What would such a theory be called?
After seeing the problems with the traditional theories of personal identity, many people think that a proper theory of diachronic personal identity involves combining the theories together in some way. Theories that combine the traditional theories together are known as what type of theory?
True or False. One problem with hybrid theories is that they tend to inherit (rather than solve) the problems of the non-hybrid theories. So, instead of being a better option than the non-hybrid theory, hybrid theories are often a worse option
Let \(A\) and \(B\) be two distinct persons. Now imagine that two people come together and form a third person \(C\). What is such a situation called?
What are the two main types of personal identity fusions? Indicate both.
True or false. According to psychological theories, fusion of apparent memories is possible since it is possible to have apparent memories of events that are impossible, e.g., I could have memories of growing up in Highland, Indiana and also of growing up in Blue Island, Illinois.
True or false. According to psychological theories, if two people are fused, then it is plausible for at least one of the two fused people to survive (e.g., in the scenario where only a small fragment of another person is fused into you).
True or false. According to the Improvement Scenario (regarding psychological fusion), if \(A\) is fused with \(B\), then it is plausible that \(A\) survives fusion provided (1) the essential parts of \(A\)’s psychology is preserved and (2) the components of \(B\) fused into \(A\) are traits that either (a) “fix” \(A\) or (b) enhance \(A\) and \(A\) desires the enhancement.
How do you italicize a word in Markdown?
How do you create a section header in Markdown?
If you are paraphrasing someone else’s idea rather than directly quoting them, do you still need to provide a citation?
Suppose you see the following at the end of a paper: Agler, David W. Symbolic Logic: Syntax, Semantics, and Proof. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013. This would be an example of what kind of citation?
Consider the following citation: Immanuel Kant. 1781. Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK. The italicized portion of this citation refers to what part of the citation?
Suppose there is a long passage of text (6 sentences) that you want to quote as a block quote. However, you don’t want to quote the entire passage. Instead, you want to quote the first 3 sentences and the last sentence. In order to exclude the 4th and 5th sentence, you can do what?
If there is a passage that you want to quote that is four or more lines, then you should do what?
Essay Question: The biological-connectedness theory of personal identity says person \(A\) at \(t_1\) and person \(B\) at \(t_2\) are one and the same person provided there is biological connectedness between \(A\) and \(B\). First, why is the biological-connectedness theory an improvement over saying that \(A=B\) provided \(A\) and \(B\) have exactly the same body. Second, list (1., 2., 3.) the three necessary conditions required for \(A\) and \(B\) to be biologically connected (to have the same body). Third, list a hypothetical counter-example for each condition. That is, state how it would be possible for \(A\) and \(B\) to be the same person (\(A=B\)) even though that condition is not met.
Essay Question: What is the question of numerical diachronic personal identity? In answering this question, be sure to include a reference to the following concepts (along with examples to help illustrate these concepts): numerical identity, qualitative similarity, qualitative identity, the narrow question of diachronic numerical identity, the broad (general) question of diachronic numerical identity?