

Three Responses to the Gettier Objection

No False Grounds Approach

(3_{aNF}) *S* knows that *p* = Df. (1) *S* believes that *p*, (2) *p* is true, (3) *p* is epistemically justified for *S*, and (4) *S*'s justification for *p* is not the result of an inference from a false proposition *q*.

Objection

1. (3_{aNF}) is not sufficient (too weak) — from Feldman, Richard. 1974. An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counterexamples. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 52, pp.68-9.

First Case — Gettier Objection Works

T – (m) Mr. Nogot tells Smith that he owns a Ford and he shows Smith the title to his Ford.

F – (r) Mr. Nogot who is in Smith's office owns a Ford

T – (h) Someone in Smith's office owns a Ford

Modified Case — Gettier Example Supposedly Fails

T – (m) Mr. Nogot tells Smith that he owns a Ford and he shows Smith the title to his Ford.

T – (n) There is someone in the office who told Smith that he owns a Ford and showed Smith the title, and this same person has always been reliable and honest with Smith.

T – (h) Someone in Smith's office owns a Ford

2. (3_{aNF}) is false (too strong)

Defeasibility Approach

(3_{aD}) *S* knows that *p* = Df. (1) *S* believes that *p*, (2) *p* is true, (3) *p* is epistemically justified for *S*, and (4) there is also no other proposition *q* such that if *S* believed *q*, then *p* would no longer be epistemically justified for *S*.

Evidential Defeat

e defeats *f* as evidence for *p* = Df. *e* is evidence for proposition *p*, but *e* and *f* are not evidence for *p*.

Objections

Problems with Subjunctive Conditionals

Justificational Evidential Defeat

Factual Evidential Defeat

Knowledge with a Factual Defeasibility Clause

(3_{aFD}) *S* knows that *p* = Df. (1) *S* believes that *p*, (2) *p* is true, (3) *p* is epistemically justified for *S*, and (4) there is also no other proposition *q* that factually defeats *p*.

Knowledge with a Justificational Defeasibility Clause

(3_{aJD}) *S* knows that *p* = Df. (1) *S* believes that *p*, (2) *p* is true, (3) *p* is epistemically justified for *S*, and (4) there is also no other proposition *q* that justificationaly defeats *p*.

Objections

Causal Approach

(3_{aC}) *S* knows that *p* = Df. (1) *S* believes that *p*, (2) *p* is true, and (3) *p* is causally (and appropriately) connected with *S*'s belief that *p*.

Objections

No general propositions

Problems with Causal Reconstruction

Goldman's Barn Facsimilies

For next time, read Lemos, pp. 31-41, re-read pp.17-21,

1. Be able to articulate the general idea of the Defeasibility and Causal Responses to Gettier's
2. Be able to distinguish, in an understandable way, between *justificational evidential defeat* and *factual evidential defeat*.
3. Be able to articulate at least one objection to the Defeasibility and Causal Responses.