

## The Basic Question about Knowledge

- (1q) What is knowledge?
- (2q) What is knowledge for a human subject  $S$ ?

## Types of Knowledge

1. Propositional Knowledge
2. Acquaintance Knowledge
3. 'How To' Knowledge

## Propositional Knowledge

- (1q) What is knowledge?
- (2q) What is knowledge for a human subject  $S$ ?
- (3q) What is it for  $S$  to know that  $p$ ?

## Answers to the Question — What is Propositional Knowledge?

### *Knowledge is Belief (B)*

- (1a)  $S$  knows that  $p =$  Df.  $S$  believes that  $p$ .

This definition of knowledge claims that  $S$ 's *belief* is sufficient for knowledge.

### *Knowledge is True Belief (TB)*

- (2a)  $S$  knows that  $p =$  Df. (1)  $S$  believes that  $p$  and (2)  $p$  is true

This definition of knowledge claims that a subject's *true belief* is sufficient for knowledge.

### *Knowledge is Justified True Belief (JTB)*

While true belief alone is not sufficient for knowledge, **epistemically justified** true beliefs might be. That is, to the question 'what is it for  $S$  to know that  $p$ ?', we might claim that for  $S$  to know that  $p$  it is sufficient that not only does  $S$  believe  $p$  and  $p$  is true, but  $S$  has good reasons to believe that  $p$  is true.

- (3a)  $S$  knows that  $p =$  Df. (1)  $S$  believes that  $p$ , (2)  $p$  is true, and (3)  $p$  is epistemically justified for  $S$ .

## Examining (1)–(3) in (3a)

*Clause (1)—The 'Belief' in  $p$  in JTB*  
Belief as a propositional attitude

The Intensity of a Belief  
Dispositional vs. Occurrent Beliefs

*Clause (2)—The ‘Truth’ of  $p$  in JTB*

There are a variety of different theories of truth. Your book considers some. Generally, we will assume that for the majority of propositions, their truth depends on something independent of belief alone. Call these ‘the facts’ or ‘the world’.

*Clause (3)—The ‘Epistemic justification’ of  $p$  for  $S$ .*

First, epistemic Justification is a distinct form of justification

Second, a proposition  $p$  can be true but not epistemically justified.

Third, a proposition  $p$  can be epistemically justified but not true.

Fourth, a proposition  $p$  can be epistemically justified for a person but the person may not be able to justify  $p$ .

Fifth, epistemic justification for a proposition  $p$  can be relative.

Sixth, epistemic justification may come in degrees.

Seventh, a proposition  $p$  can be epistemically justified for  $S$  but  $S$  may not believe  $p$  on the basis of the evidence that supports  $p$ .

A proposition  $p$  is **well-founded** for  $S$  = Df. (1)  $p$  is epistemically justified for  $S$ , and (2)  $S$  believes  $p$  based upon the evidence that makes  $p$  epistemically justified for  $S$ .

Revision to (3a)

(3a)  $S$  knows that  $p$  = Df. (1)  $S$  believes that  $p$ , (2)  $p$  is true, and (3)  $p$  is epistemically justified for  $S$ .

(4a)  $S$  knows that  $p$  = Df. (1)  $S$  believes that  $p$ , (2)  $p$  is true, and (3)  $p$  is epistemically justified for  $S$ , and (4)  $S$  believes  $p$  based upon the evidence that makes  $p$  epistemically justified for  $S$ .

Reduces to

(4a)  $S$  knows that  $p$  = Df. (1)  $S$  believes that  $p$ , (2)  $p$  is true, and (3)  $p$  is well-founded for  $S$ .